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Introduction
The Slovene Chamber of Pharmacy not long ago announced an increase in prices for the medicines. As a reason they have stated a higher volume of medicines and higher quality treatment of consumers. This gave them the right to higher revenues. At the same time the Chamber of Pharmacy achieved, that the first internet based pharmacy, which was established by private pharmacist (their potential competitor) was closed.
1 Above example shows a common way for an increase in the prices in the nontradable sector of the Slovene economy. If the none-competitive structure of the nonetradable sector is one of the main causes of Slovene inflation, 2 the optimal monetary policy should focus on the abolishment of this disproportion's (Bole, 2003) . In an open economy, monetary policy should steam to dampen down the supply shocks, that are caused by increase in the prices in the none-tradable sector. Even if there exist a complete exchange-rate pass-through, targeting reduction of the domestic inflation remains a key factor, regardless of the fact, that such targeting causes a variability of exchange rate, which has a direct impact on the inflation. Otherwise the successful reduction of the inflation, the competitiveness of the tradable sector and the long run growth of a economy would be at stake (Aoki, 1999; Gali and Monaceli, 2000; Clarida et. al. 2001) .
In this paper we analyze the sensitivity of the tradable sector of the Slovene economy to the external shocks. To known distortions, that have roots in market failures in the domestic markets (none-competitiveness of the none-tradable sector, distortions in the labor markets...) we add the specific behavior of Slovene firms in foreign markets. In comparison with their global competitors, their economic power is very small. Their sales depends heavily on a small number of buyers ( truncated firm). 3 Hence ent ry and exit costs (switching costs) of Slovene firms are large. This is especially true for their main exporting market i.e. European Union (EU) markets.
When the absorption power of the exporting market declines, firms still trade with 1 Delo, 28th and 29th April 2003. 2 More on market failure and inflation can be found in Chinn and Johnston (1999) and Cheung et.al (1999) . 3 The term truncated firm stands for a firm that heavily depends on a small number of big buyers and
is not yet fully developed. (i.e. restructuring process is still taking place). According to the size of the firm and development of their business functions, majority of Slovene firms can be classified into a "middle" firms (Debeljak et. al., 2002; Snaith and Walker, 2002) .
their established buyers (hysteresis), despite the fact, that due to lower prices, their exporting revenues decline. However in case of the unexpected and long-term decline of absorption power or in case of the unsatisfactory policy that would lead to the reduction of the competitiveness of the tradable sector, a huge number of firms would exit from the foreign markets.
The paper proceeds as follows. We begin in section 2 with the presentation of hysteresis, which is present on key Slovene exporting markets. We explain the hysteresis with the sunk costs. In third section we developed a model that tries to explain the persistence of Slovene firms in EU markets. We show that the persistence can be explained with the high exit costs. The firm that makes most of it revenues in EU, remains in that markets despite the fact, that this worsens the financial success of it. This is especially true in case of a decline of the absorption power of EU i.e.
decline in the growth rate of EU markets. The decline in demand leads to reduction in the cash flow and in order to continue the production, firms need to take loans.
However indebtedness is limited. Banks namely give loans based on the expected solvency that can be seen as the credit rating of a firm. As a result, the negative external shock could be devastating for the exporting part of the Slovene economy.
We conclude in section 4. Baldwin (1988) , Dixit (1989) and Krugman (1989) explain asymmetric responses of firms on a real exchange rate changes by a sunk costs, that firms face when they enter or/and exit a market. When the firm enters a foreign market needs to cover the entry costs, which later on become sunk. As a result the entry conditions are different as the exit ones. Entry price, that needs to cover both the operational and the sunk cost, is in case of zero exit cost higher, than the exit price, that needs to cover only operational costs. In case of none zero exit cost this price can even fall below a operational costs, while firms do not exit the market. Due to the sunk costs, the current number of exporters depends on the type and number of exporters in the previous period. This leads to hysteresis in the exporting flows. 4 Many Slovene firms have l ong exporting tradition on the developed western markets (mainly on EU). Entry cost of the majority of Slovene firms on these markets are not small. They can be explained either with a establishment of long term production relationship with permanent buyers 5 or with a high cost of forming its own distribution and sales network and a creation of the trade marks in this markets. 6 Before 1991 Slovene firms were also heavily present in the former Yugoslav markets and in the former socialist countries, mainly in Russia. At the fall of the Berlin wall and the succession of the former Yugoslavia many of them exited. At the end of nineties of previous century and at the beginning of this century they slowly started to re-enter. The re-entry of Slovene firms is due to finding new opportunities which are available with opening of these markets and with lower entry cost that Slovene firms face compared to other foreign competitors The last is a consequence of past participation of Slovene firms on these markets.
Hysteresis in participation of Slovene firms in exporting markets

It has to be noted that increased participation of Slovene firms in former
Yugoslav markets and Russia is not a simple redirection of export from developed countries to new (old) market. In the second part of nineties of the previous century Slovene firms made substantial investment in their production. This investment cycle was based on stable demand in EU (Domadenik et. al., 2002) . Since the conditions on EU are worsening the increase in a demand in former Yugoslav markets and Russia allows firms to fill the excess capacities. However they do not decrease the sales to EU. Namely on one side would the exit from EU market lead to high exit costs (compensation money for excess workers) and on the other side would later re-entry on EU, that could be caused with lower profitability (high risk) of the new markets, require also a high entry costs. 4 The effect of sunk entry costs on export participation of firms is analyzed by a number of authors. Feinberg (1992) finds that relative increases in a number of companies are smaller for industries with large sunk costs. Campa (1993) finds that the entry of exporters to the United States is negatively correlated to the variability of a exchange rate and a size of the entry costs. Roberts and Tybout (1997) reject the null hypothesis that sunk costs have no effect on the export participation of Columbian manufacturing plants. Das et al. (2001) with the help of a dynamic model evaluate the size of sunk costs using a plant-panel data on the Columbian chemical producers. 5 An example of such long run business relationship which usually requires also asset specific investment are Prevent, that produces seats for Volkswagen and Mura, that produces cloths for Hugo Boss. 6 A good example is Gorenje.
Next we present a model of an entry with sunk cost. which we will later on estimate on the export participation data of Slovene firms in period 1992-2001.
Model of entry with sunk costs
Consider a company that is producing a single product, and is deciding to enter a given foreign market. Suppose that the profit maximizing quantity is one unit per year, so that the revenue from the project is simply the output price P in the home currency and P* in the foreign currency. Let ? be the rate of interest and w be the operating cost of doing business in a foreign market.
Under the standard Marshallian theory, there exist entry and exit prices H P and L P , which are determined by cost of capital, operating costs and sunk investment.
The company accepts the project (enters the market) if the price of the product (in the home currency) exceeds the sum of operating costs an annualized cost of capital:
Equation (1) can be rewritten by replacing the right hand side of the equation with H P , that represents the price that triggers entry:
[2]
If the company is already present in the market, it remains there if price P exceeds at least operating costs w:
Operating costs w represent the lower limit L P , which triggers exit if price of the product P falls below it. Values H P and L P determine the conditions for entry and exit of the company.
The presence of sunk costs apparently induces asymmetrical responses of companies to changes in export conditions, such as changes in the exchange rate.
Reaction of the company to changes in price P depends largely on whether the company exported during the previous period.
Imagine now that price P is currently between H P and L P . If we are not fa miliar with company's previous exporting status, we are not able to tell if the company is currently present in the market. Namely if the company was present in a given export market in the previous period, it is also currently present since price P exceeds exit price L P . On the other hand, if the company was not present in the market in the previous period, it will remain absent also in the current period since Baldwin (1988) and Baldwin and Krugman (1989) and outflows of each alternative, which are governed by stochastic processes, where they take into consideration all the variables that affect the net present value (NPV). either increase or decrease in the future with a probability of one half. The NPV of entering option when price P equals entry price P H is obviously 0. On the other hand, the option of not entering is more attractive. Namely, if the price falls in the future, a company will not enter, where the NPV of this option is 0; but if it rises, a company can enter and have positive economic profit since inflows exceed sum of operating and cost of capital. Since both possibilities are equally likely (with probability one half) the NPV of the non-entering option, which is an equally weighted sum of the two possibilities of price movement, is positive.
The NPV of the non-entering option is higher than the NPV of the entering option. Due to that, a price that triggers entry under the option theory is higher then under the standard explanation of hysteresis effect. A question that arises is: why should a company enter at all if it can only gain by waiting? When analyzing the NPV of the non-entering option, we have to consider that company also looses by not entering, since it sacrifices current exporting profits in the case when revenues exceed the sum of operating costs and cost of capital. Eventually for some higher price P (bigger then P H ), the sacrifice of current profits becomes more important and the company decides to enter. Under the option theory, the ent ry price is thus higher then under the standard approach.
More generally the participation condition can be written as:
8 As in Dixit (1989) , Robrts and Tybout (1997) , Das et al. (2001) 
Equation (7) 
There are two ways we may precede in estimating equation (8) 
In order to identify the model, we must make additional restrictions. Firstly we assume that companies that have not exported for more then two years face the same entry cost. Secondly, we assume that the entry costs are equal for all companies (10) 
Another term that was included in equation (11) Before moving on to estimation and results, we discuss our data set and export patterns of Slovene companies.
Variable statistics and data sample 2.2.1. Nonrandom samples
We evaluate the effect of sunk costs on the export decisions of Slovene firms on the export markets on a panel of approximately 160 large and medium Slovene firms. The sample represent 32% of Slovenian export revenues in year 2000, 18,9 % of all employees, 25% of profits and 8% of balance sheet capital. The sample is nonerandom. Despite that, we believe, that our sample is relevant for analyzing the effects of sunk costs on export participation of Slovene firms, since it contains core firms of Slovene economy.
The panel contains data from publicly available information, such as balance sheet, income statement etc, and non-publicly available information (export revenues on different markets, investments in physical capital…), which were obtained via a questionnaire. For some firms we were unable to obtain all the data, mainly the data about export participation and value of the revenues in exporting markets before 1996. Also some firms were created in the observed period. As a result the number of firms that have complete data on share of revenues to different markets in the period 1992-2001 is a bit smaller (110 firms). In the period 1996-2001, the number of firms with complete data is bigger (155 firms). The latest data set contains also the firm heterogeneity data (i.e. ownership structure...). Namely the privatization process was finished in a year 1995. For 112 firms out of 155, we were able also to obtain the credit rating information from Nova Ljubljanska Bank. In table 1 we show summary statistics and standard deviations of the variables that are used in our analysis. They are presented for three samples of firms explained above.
According to the classification of SURS firms are classified in five groups of industries: 1) food and beverages; 2) chemical, oil and rubber products; 3) metal, electrical and optical industry; 4) retail, wholesale and 5) miscellaneous.
Entry and exit
First we show entry and exit dynamics of Slovene firms to different export markets (EU, Russia and countries of former Yugoslavia). In table 2 is pretty stable in the Croatia and BIH, the FRY and Macedonia show cyclical movements that can be explained with political situation in these countries. In last two years, Slovene firms started to enter the FRY markets on a bigger scale. 
Description of the variables
Since the long time sample contains less data than the short time sample our analysis will be mainly based on the later sample. The data in table 1 show, that firms that contain also information about their credit rating 9 are bigger and more export oriented compared to firms in the full short time period sample. This is not surprising since one of the main activities of the banks is financing export activities of the firms.
Since we will use the credit rating information only in the last part of our analysis, the below description of variables corresponds to the full short time period sample (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) .
The average firm has 544 employees, its coefficient of sales in fixed assets is 2.07. The average firm makes 59.7% of all revenues makes in domestic (Slovene) market. The share of labor costs in value added 10 is 71%, the share of short-term liabilities in total liabilities and shareholder's equity is 30%.
In graph 1 and 2 we show average value of revenues (only for firms that export to given market is positive) by years. As evident from graphs, average revenues are highest for Slovene market, as it is to be expected, whereas the export revenues are highest for the EU markets. Average revenues in EU grew for the whole period. The increase in the revenues is 37%. Russia exhibits great variability of the export revenues, where the whole period is marked by a significant decline in 1999.
9 Credit rating information of firms were provided by Nova Ljubljanska Bank. 10 We have calculated value added as labor costs plus amortization plus (minus) profit (loss). Looking at the variables that measure the ownership structure we see that the share of the insiders (workers, managers, former employees) has declined from 38.73% in year 1996 to 25.32% in year 2001. There was also a decline in share of the investment and government funds from 38.88% in year 1996 to 31.79% in year 2001.
On the other side, the power of small shareholders and other firms have increased.
The ownership share of other firms increased from 9.29% to 28.68% and the ownership share of small shareholders increased from 13.69% to 14.37%. The increase of the ownership share of other firms is a result of takeovers, while the increase of the mall shareholders can be explained by an open market operations on the stock exchange. The average share of the nternal members of supervisory boards is declining over the whole period (54.93% in year 1996, 44.70% in year 2001).
The average share of top executives in all employees has increased from 2.42% in year 1996 to 2.66% in year 2001. In the same period the share of managers with seventh or higher level education have increased from 61.25% to 71.46%. On the other side, the share of replaced managers that was around 6% at the beginning of period reached its peak at 9.22% in year 1997 and then declined substantially in years 2001 and 2001 (to around 1%) . It seems that after privatization most of the firms changed their managers. After that, the process of replacement settled down. The average age of chief executive is 50 years and on this position is on average already 9 years.
Econometric results
A reduced form equation
Deriving from the model, we can represent firm's presence in a given export market (Y it ) as a function of company's previous exporting history (sunk costs), company heterogeneity or observable firm differences and changes in export conditions. The signs below the equation indicate the expected relationships between the dependent and independent variables. As mentioned earlier we expect past presence to have a positive effect on current market participation. We also expect that larger companies will find it easier to do business abroad and be more competitive due to economies of scale. Similarly we expect that companies that pay higher wages are more competitive in outside markets. It is more likely that a company will be present if it has an experienced manager and well educated management team (Domadenik et. al., 2000 , Prašnikar et. al., 2002 . Re garding joint stock companies, we expect that to have a positive effect on companies presence on a given export market. the same applies for companies with a higher share of outside owners and a higher share of outside members in the supervisory board (Frydman et. al., 1999, Murrell and 11 The miscellaneous owner category does not include the percentage of shares owned by insiders (workers, managers and retired workers, LS1) because this share of ownership is treated as the base, captured in the regression constant, against which the effects of other forms of ownership are being estimated. 12 The exchange rate is not explicitly included in our model. This is a consequence of two factors. Firstly, inclusion of yearly dummies excludes inclusion of exchange rate due to co-linearity. Due to the fact that political tensions are more significant for countries under observation we decided to include yearly dummies that better describe this effects. Secondly, export decisions of companies depend on export prices that are not in one-to-one correspondence with exchange rate (i.e. depend also on other factors). The effects of relative prices are to some extent taken into account with the inclusion of industry dummies and yearly dummies. Djankov 2001, Prašnikar and Gregoric, 2002) . For other variables, predicted signs are difficult to determine.
Empirical Results
Estimation of the participation equation (12) find that the last year's exporting status has a strong positive effect on probability of exporting in current year. As expected the probability that a company exports in current year if it last exported two years ago is lower but still significant. Using
Wald's test, we can reject the hypothesis that both coefficients are jointly equal to zero. The effect of past experience on entry cost deteriorates with time 14 for all areas except for EU, where due to lack of data, variable Y t-2 / Y t-1 was not included. As mentioned earlier companies did not step down from EU market after 1996.
In most equations (except Russia) coefficient on pp90 is positive and significant, which indicates that presence in the markets before 1990 significantly affects the probability of exporting in the current period. The coefficient on pp90 is also significant in the longer period (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) . Although the values of coefficient 13 Under the assumption that error term (? it ) is normally distributed, the equation (11) can be estimated with pooled probit model (Greene, 2002) . However in our case a more reasonable assumption is that the error term (? it ) is the sum of permanent, plant specific component,? I , and residual, ? it (i.e. companies differ in their inclination towards export markets). This leads to inconsistency of parameters when using simple estimation technique regardless on the assumption made about behavior of ? it (independently distributed or serially correlated). The consistency of parameter estimation in dynamic non-linear models with unobserved heterogeneity depends heavily on specification of initial conditions. Solving this problem is far more difficult in non-linear models then in linear models since there doesn't exist a general transformation that would eliminate unobserved heterogeneity and lead into useful moment conditions. The above problem can be solved with Heckman (1981a Heckman ( , 1981b 14 Exporting experience for more than two years was not included due to small numbers of examples of companies that returned to the market after more then two years' absence. on pp90 are still significant when it comes to states of former Yugoslavia and Russia, they are considerably smaller then in the case of EU markets. The EU markets stand out as the most important markets for Slovenian companies. Once the company enters into EU market it rarely ever exits. It is hard to determine whether this is consequence of very large sunk cost of entry and exit or a consequence of some other factor due to small variability of export presence in the sample. It is, therefore, possible that companies persist in the EU markets despite unsatisfactory results (distressed exports) 15 .
The next group of coefficients summarizes the effects of specific company characteristics on export participation. Size of company matters when it comes to markets of Russia and FRY (both short and long term sample). It matters also in the market of BIH if we only look at the results of longer time period 1992-2001. It seems that these markets are more risky and that larger companies diversify risk easier. As mentioned earlier, the number of variables that are included in the model is different for short and long samples. Therefore, it may happen that the results on coefficients of variables differ among long and short sample. For example, when we include into our model of export participation on markets of EU variable legal status of company, the sign of the coefficient on size changes from positive and nearly significant to negative and significant. It seems that the change in sign of coefficient is connected to the entrance of smaller companies (mainly limited liability companies). Most of these companies were formed after 1990, due to breakup of larger companies and takeovers.
These smaller companies are oriented mainly to EU markets and are thus more affected by crisis on these markets than large companies.
The ownership variables and the structure of supervisory board do not seem to influence companies export participation (the exception is EU market where external ownership is more important than internal one). The results also show that motivation of employees is not an important factor in explaining export participation. It also seems that no type of industry is more present in exports markets, except for companies forming fifth group (miscellaneous). The sign of industry dummy for that group is negative for all markets, however it is significant only for markets of EU, BIH and Croatia. 15 We test the effect of export participation on company's financial stability in following section 
Conclusion
We can conclude that hysteresis is an important factor in explaining the export participation of Slovene firms. This is especially true for the EU markets. The results also show that the variables that measure heterogeneity of firms are not very important in explaining export participation of Slovene firms. Macroeconomic and political stability of former Yugoslav countries and Russia are very important in explaining export dynamics of Slovene firms. Probably these markets are very risky and firms' behavior accounts for that fact. The nice example is Croatia. Besides EU markets, this market was for Slovene firms the most stable one. Most of our firms were present in Croatia already before 1991. However the average export to Croatia does not increase over "safe" level. It seems, that due to high risk firms form a kind of "security" limit.
Export to EU and the financial success
Exit costs as a reason for persistence of Slovene firms in EU markets
In the previous section we have shown that the markets of EU are the main exporting markets for Slovene firms. When a firm enters into that markets usually does not exit. Besides the entry costs, the key role play also the exit costs. Exist costs consist of the switching costs (costs of replacing stable buyers with new ones) and the costs of reducing the production (compensation money for excess workers) when firm is not able to replace old customers with new ones. Firms that are heavily dependent from sales in EU markets, where the competition is severe and the possibility of charging the price above marginal cost is small, remain in the EU markets despite the fact, that they hardly cover the variable costs. It is even possible, that occasionally the price falls below the variable costs but the firm does not exit from that market.. This is more likely to happen if the absorption power of the markets (growth rate of EU All above hypothesis are related with the size of the exit costs. The exit costs of the firms that create most of its revenues in the EU markets are high due to high cost of replacing their customers. If the growth rate of EU markets decline and the firms are unable to find new, more profitable markets, they face problems, since they are confronted with excess workers (compensation money). Similar problems face firms that are operating in the simple phase in the chain of the value added creation. Hence the high exit costs increases probability that the firms remain in the EU markets despite the declines in prices and profits.
We will test above hypothesis in a similar manner as we have tested the existence of sunk cost in previous section. We can write the exit condition for a firm in a similar manner as entry condition that is given in (6). The only difference is that we replace entry cost with exit costs:
The firm remains in the exporting market as long as the expected loss (the difference between staying in the market Y=1 and exiting Y=0) in this market is smaller as the exit costs (E). 16 For Slovene firms more suitable is the strategy of differentiated products and services and satisfying Based on above discussion, the exit costs from the EU markets can be written where we have assumed that the exit costs are proportional to the size of the firm (V). The size of exit costs depends on the share of revenues created in the EU markets (s EU = revenues in EU/all revenues), growth rate of EU economy (g) and the share of labor costs in the value added (w).
Following the procedure in section 2.1. and using the fact that in reduced form equation the difference between being in a given market or not depends on macroeconomic factors, characteristics of the firm and on the error term, the equation (9) Described procedure is very general. The exact equation used in the empirical implementation is given in the next section.
Estimation of the financial success e quation
For an empirical implementation we write equation (18) where the independent variable (B09fa) is a cash flow (B06) divided by the fixed assets (fa). 17 The independent variables are share of sales in EU (peu) 18 , absEU measures the growth rate of the German economy, peuabsEU=absEU*peu and the variable DLCvVA, which measures the labor costs in the value added. The variable e11 measures share of managers in total employment, e13 is the share of managers with educational level VII or higher, the variable e4m is the share of replaced managers, e51 is the age of chief executive and the variable e52 measures how many year was the chief executive at this position. The variables LS2, LS3 and LS4 measure an ownership structure. The variable LS2 measures an ownership share of the investment and government funds, LS3 measures an ownership share of the other firms and LS4 is the ownership share of other owners. The LS4 does not include the inside owners (workers, mangers, former employees). The inside owners serve namely as a base (LS1). The variable NS2 measures the share of external members in supervisory board, while dd is a dummy variable that has a value 1 if the firm is a joint stock company. 17 The fixed assets serve as a proxy for the size of the firm. One reason for taking the fixed assets instead of revenues is that it eliminates the influence of cyclicality of an economy. However, there is also another reason. The variable B09fa is also an important from the lender (bank) view. Namely, bank is using this variable to determine the credit rating of a firm. More detailed discussion is given in section 3.3.
Equation ( Among the variables that measure the influence of managers on financial success of the firm, the variable e4m is negative and very statistically significant.
Higher the share of replaced managers, less successful the firm is. The coefficient of variable e11 (share of managers in total employment) is also negative and statistically significant at 10% level. This could imply that to many managers could lead to managerial slack. Other variables that measure influence on managers are not statistically significant.
Hypothesis H9a is not supported by our data. Also we do not find support for hypothesis H10a and H11a.
We can conclude that exit costs are an important factor for explaining the persistence of Slovene firms in the EU markets. If the firm is heavily focused on EU markets, it has a higher exit costs (cost of replacement). Hence, the firm does not exit from the EU markets even if this worsens their financial position. This is especially true in case of the decline of absorption power in the EU markets.
Expected solvency of firms
We have shown that due to high exit costs Slovene firms do not exit from EU We have tested the hypothesis of persistence of Slovene firms in EU markets due to high exit costs also with the expected solvency of the firms, which is based on the credit rating information.
Out of a full sample of 155 firms in a period 1996-2001, we were able to obtain for 112 firms their credit rating information. The quarterly credit rating information were collected from the Nova Ljubljanska Bank. 20 In the analysis we have use the credit rating information on 1st of April of current year. The credit rating 19 Taking loans from suppliers and not paying the bills is the common strategy used by Slovene firms. This is especially true for the firms which have adequate market power (Prašnikar et. al., 2002) 20 Only 112 firms gave us the permission to collect their credit rating from the Nova Ljubljanska Bank.
was used as dependent variable. To firms with credit rating A we assigned value 2, to firms with credit rating B value 1 was assigned, to other firms we assigned value 0.
Independent variables are the cash flow in fixed assets (B09fa), the share of short range liabilites in total liabilites and shareholder's equity liabilites (D32v36) and the firm characteristic variables ( variables that measure managers influence: e11, e13, e4m, e51 and e52; variables that measure ownership structure and structure of the supervisory board: LS2, LS3, LS4 NS2; variable that measure legal status (dd) and industry dummies).The variable pure cash flow reflects the most general measure of credit ranking of the firms. It reflects the ability of firms to repay their obligations.
We have normalized the variable cash flow with fixed assets since the banks generally tie up the ability to repay loans with the size of mortgage insurance that is linked with the value of fixed assets. The variable D32v36 reflects the short-term indebtedness of a firm that is usually used as an alternative measure for rating of firms.
We have estimated the relationship between credit rating and independent variables with random effect ordered probit model. 21 The estimator takes into account:
(1) that dependent variable has an ordinal meaning. In our case the variable credit rating takes values 0,1 and 2. The firms with the highest credit rating (A) have value 2, firms with credit rating B have value 1 and for the other firms the value of credit rating is 0. The fact that value 2 reflects the higher credit rating as value 1 contains useful information despite the fact that the variable credit rating has only ordinal meaning; (2) the panel structure of the data, where the error term (? it ) is the sum of the plant specific component ( ? i ) and the residual ( ? it ). The results of the expected solvency of the firms are given in table 7.
From table 7 we can see that the coefficient of the cash flow in fixed assets (B09fa) has a positive sign and is highly statistically significant. The firms with higher value of cash flow in fixed assets have on average higher credit rating. The coefficient of short term obligations in total liabilities and shareholder's equity ( D32v36) is negative and also highly significant. The firms with higher value of the variable D32v36 have lower credit rating. Hence both variables have expected signs. For firms that makes most of their revenues in EU at a declining cash flow, is expected that their solvency will decrease. With the decrease in credit rating, firms ability to get bank loans will decrease and/or they will be able to get loans under much stricter conditions. This will be true even more in the case that the growth rate of EU economy will decline. Also the firms that are more indebted will have bigger problems with getting the loans.
Some manager variables and other variables that reflect the firm's heterogeneity are statistically significant which was not the case in estimation of equation (19). Some of the variables have even the reverse sign. We have to note again that the sample of 112 (out of 155) consists of the firms that that gave us the permission to use their credit rating information. As a result we do not pay to much attention to the signs of the variables that reflect the heterogeneity of the firm. They were include mainly because we wanted to control for heterogeneity in estimating the expected solvency of the firms.
Conclusion
To known distortions, tha t have roots in market failures in domestic markets (none-competitiveness of the none-tradable sector, the distortions in labor markets...)
we add the specific behavior of Slovene firms in foreign markets. In comparison with their global competitors their economic power is very small. Their sales depends heavily on a small number of buyers (truncated firm).
When firm enters in foreign market needs to cover the entry costs, which later on become sunk. As a result, the entry conditions are different as exit ones. Entry price that needs to cover both the operational and the sunk costs is in case of zero exit cost higher than the exit price that needs to cover only the operational costs. In case of none zero exit cost this price can even fall below the operational cost, while firms do not exit the market.
We have shown that sunk costs are present in the export participation of Slovene firms. Our results also show that when the absorption power of the exporting market declines, firms still trade with their established buyers (hysteresis) despite the fact that due to lower prices their exporting revenues decline. However in case of the unexpected and long-term decline of the absorption power or in case of the unsatisfactory policy that would lead to reduction of competitiveness of the tradable sector, a huge number of firms would exit from foreign markets. 21 More about random effect probit model can be found for example in Wooldridge (2002) or Green
The results reveal that firms do not exit from EU markets, which are the most important exporting market for Slovene firms. We show that this can be explained with high exit costs, which consist of switching costs (costs of replacing stable buyers with new ones) and cost of reducing the production (compensation money for excess workers) and high re-entry cost if firms would later on again want to replace more risky South-East European and Russian markets with EU markets.
The results reveal that the firm that makes most of it revenues in EU, remains in that market despite the fact, that this worsens the financial position of it. The results show also that his is especially true in the case of a decline of absorption power in EU i.e. decline in the growth rate of the EU markets. The decline in demand leads to reduction in cash flow and in order to continue production, firms need to take loans.
However indebtedness is limited. Banks namely give loans based on expected solvency that can be seen as the credit rating of firms. Our results confirm that credit rating is negatively related with the financial position of the firms. As a result, the negative external shock could be devastating for the exporting part of Slovene economy.
?? Campa J. M.: Entry by Foreign Firms in the United States Under Exchange Tables   Table 1: Descriptive Statistics   Variable  N 1992-2001 N 1996-2001 (all 
